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Purcell: This Is Your Captain Speaking

THIS IS YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING, PLEASE REMAIN PHYSICALLY
RESTRAINED WHILE THE ROBBERY IS IN PROGRESS
Conner J. Purcell*
ABSTRACT
This note analyzes the current circuit split over the application
of the “Physical Restraint” sentence enhancement as applied to the
crime of robbery. In the first camp, the circuit courts apply a broad or
constructive meaning of physical restraint: allowing words or demands
with the use of a firearm to trigger the enhancement. In many cases,
the courts focus on the victim’s reaction to the perpetrator rather than
the perpetrator’s actual conduct, suggesting psychological restraint
rather than physical restraint. In the second camp, the circuit courts
apply a plain meaning interpretation of physical restraint. These cases
routinely find that the use of threats or demands in conjunction with a
firearm during the course of a robbery is insufficient to trigger the
physical restraint sentencing enhancements.
The note opens with a hypothetical to set the stage, discusses
the history and mechanics of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
then examines the relevant cases of each circuit. Further, this note
advances three primary arguments for a plain language interpretation
of “physical restraint.” First, the word “physical” modifies the verb
“restraint” thereby limiting imposition of the enhancement to types of
restraint that are in fact physical.
Second, the sentencing
enhancements for threats of death and use of deadly or dangerous
instrumentalities appear in the same section as the physical restraint
*
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enhancement and would more adequately account for the type of
behavior currently being scrutinized under the physical restraint
enhancement in certain circuit courts. Thus, circuits of the first camp
are applying the incorrect enhancement.
Third, permitting
reclassification of conduct through broad interpretation in order to
trigger the physical restraint enhancement approaches the outer limits
of the rule announced in Blockburger v. United States.1 Additionally,
the analysis section of the note proposes an amendment to the
sentencing guidelines to account for the psychological restraint which
circuits of the first camp have improperly classified as physical.
Ultimately, the note argues for national adoption of the Second
Circuit’s test in United States v. Taylor,2 as the proper method for
determining whether physical restraint has occurred to ensure
appropriate application of the sentencing enhancement. Applying the
Taylor Test to the opening hypothetical, it becomes clear that the
offender’s conduct would not trigger the sentencing enhancement.
The note concludes with an overview of the Sentencing
Guidelines’ original goal of bringing national uniformity to sentencing
across the nation and discusses how the differences in interpretation
have led to the opposite result. Finally, the note once again proposes
the national adoption of Taylor in order to balance uniformity with
proportionality and give effect to the notion that “words should mean
something.”3

1

284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
961 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2020).
3
United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
2
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INTRODUCTION

It is a Friday afternoon, and you head to the bank to cash your
paycheck before heading home for what you hoped to be a relaxing
weekend. While waiting in line for a teller, a bank robber bursts in
through the door. The robber shouts “gimme the loot! gimme the
loot!”4 while brandishing a firearm. Your heart is racing as the robber
starts making demands and begins moving occupants around the bank
in furtherance of her objective. While the bank teller fills a paper bag
with unmarked bills, the robber turns to you. She points her firearm at
you and demands that you stand on one leg and hop up and down.
Although a strange request, you comply under the assumption that the
robber is here for the money and not to harm you. You hop up and
down on one leg for what feels like an eternity but what is less than
two minutes in real time. The teller finishes filling the robber’s bag
with money and hands it to the robber who departs hastily. The robber
is in and out in under five minutes and you leave physically unharmed,
untouched, and unrestrained.
Before reading any further, ask yourself: what does “physical
restraint” mean? If someone pointed their finger at you and said sit
down, would you? Would you feel “physically restrained” had this
demand been made in an aggressive manner? What if instead of a
finger, it was a knife or a firearm? You may be inclined to be more
attentive to the demands of an aggressor who threatens the use of lethal
force. However, would such a demand render one “physically
restrained,” such that movement was not a possibility?
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) do not
present a clear answer to these questions, thus resulting in a federal
circuit court split as to what “physical restraint” means. 5 Under the
current Guidelines, section 2B3.1.(b)(2) enumerates fact-specific
conduct of an offender which may subject her to enhancements or
increases in her sentence. 6 The application notes of section 1B1.1.(L)
4

THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., GIMME THE LOOT (Bad Boy & Arista Records 1994) (an
ode to the greatest of all time).
5
See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2B3.1. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021) [hereinafter Guidelines]; see also Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (outlining the current
circuit split on the issue of whether the physical restraint enhancement provision
requires actual physicality or if “psychological coercion of a gun is enough to
constitute physical restraint.”).
6
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1.(b)(2), (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
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define physical restraint as “the forcible restraint of the victim such as
by being tied up, bound, or locked up.”7 Subsection (b)(4)(B) provides
for an enhancement of two levels if the offender physically restrained
any person to facilitate the commission of the offense or to facilitate
an escape.8 The plain language of the Guidelines indicates that an
offender is required to tether, bind, or lock away a victim in order to
trigger the enhancement’s applicability. In other words, the prevention
of movement by physical contact is necessary to trigger the
enhancement. However, this is where the circuit courts diverge. The
first camp, comprised of the First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuit courts, recognize a triggering of the enhancement provision
when an offender makes threats using a deadly instrument such as a
firearm.9 These circuits reason that a weapon accompanied by a threat
engenders a constructive physical restraint on the victim. 10 The second
camp, comprised of the Second, Fifth, Seventh, D.C., and the reformed
Ninth Circuit courts, generally rely on a definition of physical restraint
consistent with a plain language reading of the Guidelines. 11
This Note supports the national adoption of the second camp’s
position, more specifically the three-part test set forth by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Taylor.12 This test stays true to the notion
that “[w]ords should mean something.” 13 In support of this position,
7

Id. § 1B1.1.(L) cmt. background.
Id. § 2B3.1.(b)(4)(B).
9
See infra Section II(A) (this section contains cases from circuits that apply
“constructive physical restraint” as the triggering the enhancement provision).
10
See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 2011).
11
See infra Section II(B) (this section contains cases from circuits that apply true
physical restrain as the triggering requirement of the enhancement provisions).
12
961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir 2020):
8

First, any restraint must be ‘physical.’ While ‘restraint’ is a condition
capable of being brought about by a number of forces,’ the Sentencing
Commission expressed ‘a more precise concept’ by including the word
‘physical’-‘an adjective which modifies (and hence limits) the noun
‘restraint.’ ‘The most pertinent definition of ‘physical’ is ‘of the body as
opposed to the mind, as, physical exercise.’…Second, we have
distinguished between qualifying physical ‘restraint’ and nonqualifying
physical ‘force.’ ‘[M]ere physical contact with the victim does not
inevitably amount to physical restraint.’ Notably, inflicting bodily injuries
during a robbery is dealt with as a separate enhancement…Third, given
that the restraint must facilitate rather than constitute the offense, it must
be more than a ‘direction to move [that] is typical of most robberies.’

Id. at 78-79 (internal citations omitted).
13
United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
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this Note will advance three primary arguments: First, use of the word
“physical,” as opposed to “mental” or “emotional,” tends to show that
physical modifies “restraint”14 and limits imposition of the
enhancement to scenarios where the offender uses physical contact to
restrict the victim’s freedom of movement in furtherance of the
commission of the crime. Second, section 2B3.1 of the Guidelines
contains alternate provisions which impose sentencing enhancements
for both threats of death and the use of deadly or dangerous
instrumentalities, thus the first camp is utilizing the wrong
enhancements. Third, permitting reclassification and reassignment of
the same conduct to trigger the physical restraint enhancement
provision through a broad interpretation of physical restraint
approaches the outer limits of a similar premise to the rule announced
in Blockburger.15
To date, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on this issue,
leading not only to a split among the circuits generally, but also to
different reasoning behind the circuits that do agree with each other.
This split has undermined the original intent of the sentencing

14

Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78; United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017)
(both showing that a plain language reading of section 2B3.1. would indicate that the
word “restraint” is modified by the adjective “physical” which imposes limitation as
to only physical restraints within the context of the statute) (citing U.S. v. Anglin,
169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999)).
15
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“The applicable rule
is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not.”). Id.
Applying this rule to the premise above, we see that essentially either the threat of
death enhancement or “constructive” physical restraint enhancement could be
triggered by proof of virtually the same facts. For example (1) a robbery occurred,
(2) during the commission of that robbery the offender used a firearm thus triggering
(b)(2)(A-E), (3) the offender pointed the firearm at the victim such that the (a) victim
was instilled with a reasonable fear of death (thus triggering (b)(2)(F) and the (b)
victim was physically restrained because the use of the firearm instilled a reasonable
fear of death (thus triggering (b)(2)(F) and (b)(4)(B)). Under this example, if applied
in Circuit Courts finding for constructive physical restraint, both the physical
restraint enhancement and threat of death enhancement could be triggered by
virtually identical conduct and without the proof of an additional fact.
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Guidelines which is to assign consistent sentences to similar or like
criminal acts and decrease sentencing disparities. 16
This Note will be divided into six sections. Section II will
provide a background on the enactment and subsequent changes to the
Guidelines based on constitutional challenges.17 Section III will
analyze the case law of the circuits which apply constructive physical
restraint while Section IV will discuss the case law of circuits which
apply a plain language meaning of physical restraint.18 Section V will
advance a national adoption of the Second Circuit’s three-part test.19
Finally, Section VI will conclude the Note, with some final remarks on
overarching policy considerations.20
II.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A.

Background

In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,21 and
created the United States Sentencing Commission.22 The Commission
was tasked with developing sentencing Guidelines for judges to use
when sentencing federal criminal offenders. 23 Until 2005, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines, as developed by the Commission, were binding
on federal courts by means of congressional statute.24 However, in
United States v. Booker,25 the Supreme Court found the mandatory
nature of the sentencing Guidelines to be unconstitutional. 26 In
Booker, the district court conducted a separate post-trial sentencing
16

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 1, Pt. A, Subpt. 1, § 3, The Basic
Approach: Policy Statement (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
17
Infra Section II.
18
Infra Sections III & IV.
19
Infra Section V.
20
Infra Section IV.
21
See Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C § 3551 (1984).
22
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. ONE, Pt. A, Subpt. 2. (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021).
23
Id.
24
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court [shall] impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, [referred to in the guidelines].” emphasis added).
25
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
26
See id. at 265-67 (showing the Supreme Court excising subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553, which as written, compelled the sentencing judge to impose a sentence within
the range set by the Guidelines, thus making them mandatory).
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hearing where additional facts were discovered by a preponderance of
the evidence and were never presented to the jury. 27 These additional
facts effectively mandated the sentencing judge to impose a sentence
nearly ten years longer than would have been applicable if relying only
on facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. 28 The Court
found this sentence violative of the Sixth Amendment principles: a
fact, which increases an offender’s sentence beyond the maximum
sentencing range, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury,
with the exception of prior convictions.29 The Court also took the
opportunity to strike down the subsection that made the Guidelines
mandatory, which effectively made the Guidelines advisory in
nature.30 A monumental case in its own right, Booker was the third
installment of the Supreme Court’s trilogy on the Sixth Amendment
issue posed by mandatory sentencing schemes and judicial fact
finding.31 In the Booker holding, the Court affirmed the principles set
forth in Apprendi,32 and Blakely,33 that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a
jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury
27

Id. at 226.
Id.
29
Id. at 232.
30
Id. at 259-61.
31
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
32
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-29 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-90 and showing the
Supreme Court’s holding that a New Jersey hate crime statute was unconstitutional.
Under this statute an offender’s sentence would be extended beyond the statutory
maximum, if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender’s
intent “was to intimidate his victim based on the victim’s particular characteristic.”
The Supreme Court found this to violate the Sixth Amendment principle, that
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
33
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-29 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300-05 and showing the
Supreme Court’s reversing a sentence whereby the sentencing judge exceeded the
permissible sentencing range imposed by statute on the basis of facts not found by
the jury. Here, the judge’s additional ninety-month increase was justified by facts
found in a separate evidentiary hearing rather than those found by a jury. Following
the same principle from Apprendi, the Supreme Court determined the sentencing
judge’s upward departure from the statutory maximum was violative of the Sixth
Amendment).
28
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”34 In a separate opinion authored in part
by Justice Stevens, the Court addressed the sections of the statute
which “were a necessary condition of the constitutional violation.” 35
Finding most of the statute valid, the Court excised only the
subsections of the statute that were necessary to cure the constitutional
violation, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).36
These excisions effectively made the Guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory37 and the standard of review on appeal would be
“reasonableness.”38
Although the Guidelines are now advisory, sentencing judges
“must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.”39 As noted in Booker, the departure from mandatory to
advisory has allowed the Guidelines to remain largely intact without
violating constitutional rights, while still maintaining congressional
objectives of certainty and fairness in sentencing and avoiding
sentencing disparities.40 Nevertheless, the Court never specifically
articulated how sentencing judges should use the Guidelines in an
advisory system, yet required them to “consult” 41 and “consider”42 the
Guidelines in their sentencing. 43 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, opined that although judges were required to consider the
Guidelines in sentencing, they “permit[ted] the court to tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”44

34

Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
Id. at 259.
36
Id. at 259-62.
37
Id. at 222.
38
Id. at 260-63 (discussing the Supreme Court’s excision of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)
which set a mandatory standard of review for appellate judges and instead imposing
a reasonableness standard. The Court also excised § 3742(e) because it set the
standard of review on appeal as dependent on cross reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b),
which the Court had also excised).
39
Id. at 264.
40
Id.
41 Id.
42
Id. at 245.
43
Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After
Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1517 (2006) (discussing the uncertainty of what
mandatory consultation of an advisory sentencing system means).
44
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
35
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In 2007, the Supreme Court decided both Rita v. United
States 45 and Gall v. United States.46 These cases clarified that a
sentencing court should begin the sentencing process “by . . .
calculate[ion] of the applicable Guideline range,”47 thus furthering the
congressional objectives of national consistency among sentencing
courts.48 When calculating an offender’s sentence, courts will start
with the base level assigned to each offense, where the numerical value
assigned indicates the number of months for which an offender may be
sentenced.49 Next, the sentencing judge will add or subtract any
adjustments and offense specific characteristics. 50 The numerical
value, after adding or subtracting adjustments, will be cross-referenced
with the offender’s criminal history. 51 A pre-determined table will
then be used to cross-reference the post adjustment offense level with
the offender’s criminal history, resulting in a range of years which the
judge will consider.52 Finally, the sentencing judge is required to give
both the prosecution and defense the opportunity to argue for the
sentence they each deem appropriate while considering all factors
relevant to the sentence.53 Rita and Gall make clear that in hearing
counsels’ arguments for an appropriate sentence, the judge may not
presume the guideline range is reasonable but must make his or her
own assessment of the requested sentence based on the facts
presented.54 In considering both mitigating and aggravating factors in
relation to the sentence, a judge may determine that a sentence either
above or below the range is warranted and has discretion to impose
such a sentence. 55 However, in exercising this discretion, courts must
“adequately explain [the departure] to allow for meaningful appellate
45

551 U.S. 338 (2007).
552 U.S. 38 (2007).
47
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49; accord Rita, 551 U.S. at 347-48.
48
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
49
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, available at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Se
ntencing_Guidelines.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50.
54
Rita, 551 U.S at 350-51; Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
55
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
46
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review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 56 The
statutory scheme of the Guidelines, outlined below, has many
considerations which can operate to either increase or decrease the
criminal defendant’s sentence.
B.

The Statutory Scheme of the Guidelines

The chapters of the Guidelines are broken into different
sections, each with a separate focus.57 Chapter Two is titled “Offense
Conduct” and focuses on the sentencing of specific crimes, 58 whereas
Chapter Three titled “Adjustments,” and Chapter Four titled “Criminal
History and Criminal Livelihood” focus on the defendant’s role in the
crime(s) being charged and recidivism of the defendant, respectively. 59
An understanding of the general framework of the Guidelines is
instructive of the enormous number of factors that play a role in the
sentencing judge’s determination and thus is instructive of the
sentencing judges’ discretion. 60
Chapter Two, titled “Offense Conduct,” is organized by types
of crimes.61 For example, Part B is titled “Basic Economic Crimes,” 62
and within part B, specific crimes that are inherently economic in
nature, such as theft, burglary and robbery, are enumerated. 63 Each
specifically enumerated crime is assigned a “base level offense”
corresponding to a numerical value as a starting point. 64 This Note will
now focus on the base offense level provisions involving the specific
56

Id. (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351, noting the requirement a sentencing judge explain
the departure from the appropriate Guidelines range based on an assessment of all
relevant factors, in order to assist the appellate court in determining whether the
sentence met the standard of review, abuse of discretion).
57
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
58
Id. at Ch. TWO.
59
Id. at Ch. THREE & FOUR.
60
Id. at Ch. TWO (showing adjustments to the sentence based on the general
characteristics of the offense as related to the victim, the defendant’s role in the
offense, the defendant’s interaction with law enforcement post apprehension, the
number of counts charged and acceptance of responsibility); see also id. at Ch. FOUR
(showing enhancements on the basis of recidivism).
61
See generally id. at Ch. TWO.
62
Id. at Ch. TWO, Pt. B.
63
Id. at §§ 2b2.1, 2b2.2, 2b2.3.
64
Id. All criminal offenses enumerated under Chapter 2 of the Guidelines provide a
base level offense.
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offense characteristic enhancement of “physical restraint” within the
context of the robbery.65
Sentencing under a conviction of robbery begins with a base
level offense of twenty months. 66 Beneath the base level offense, the
Guidelines enumerate “specific offense characteristics” 67 that range
from the use of the weapon in varying degrees, to the seriousness of
injury a victim may sustain and the amount of money actually stolen. 68
The federal circuits diverge on the interaction between sub-sections
(b)(2)(B) and (b)(4)(B).69 Under subsection (b)(2), a defendant
convicted of robbery will receive a varying degree of enhancement to
his sentence if a dangerous weapon was used.70 Subsection (b)(2) adds
different levels of enhancements depending on whether a dangerous
weapon or firearm was used and to what extent it was used in the
commission of the robbery.71 Looking forward several sub-sections to
(b)(4)(B), another enhancement of two levels can be added “if any
person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the
offense or to facilitate escape[.]” 72 The effect of this divergence has
created a split among the federal circuits where the first camp applies
the physical restraint enhancement by constructive interpretation and
the second camp applies the enhancement by a plain language
interpretation of physical restraint. 73 The following section analyzes
65

Id. at § 2B3.1.
Id. at § 2B3.1.(a).
67
Id. at § 2B3.1.(b).
68
Id. at §§ 2B3.1.(b)(2) (3) (7) (This is not meant to be a complete list of
enhancements under § 2B3.1. but rather show the wide range of conduct and
behaviors considered for enhancements under the crime of robbery).
69
Id. at §§ 2B3.1.(b)(2)(B) (b)(4)(B) (An enhancement in varying degrees for the use
and extent of a dangerous weapon or firearm arises under §§ (b)(2)(B),(C),(D) and
an enhancement of 2 levels “if any person was physically restrained to facilitate
commission of the offense or to facilitate escape” arises under § (b)(4)(B)).
70
Id. at § 2B3.1.(b)(2).
71
Id. at § (b)(2) (showing an enhancement of 7 levels if a firearm was used and
discharged, while only an enhancement of 3 level if a dangerous weapon was
brandished or possessed. This is instructive as to the large difference in potential
sentencing relative to small differences in actual conduct. For example, a robber who
commits the crime and fires a handgun into the air would start sentencing at 27
months whereas a robber who commits the crime of forcible stealing using only his
or her hands but does so with anything qualifying as dangerous weapon would start
sentencing at only 23 months).
72
Id. at § 2B3.1.(b)(4)(B).
73
Infra Parts III and IV.
66
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the constructive physical restraint application used by the Fourth, First,
Tenth, Eleventh, and formerly the Ninth Circuit courts.
III.

CIRCUIT COURTS THAT APPLY CONSTRUCTIVE PHYSICAL
RESTRAINT

This section outlines a series of circuit court decisions showing
a pattern of broad interpretation with respect to § 2B3.1.(b)(4)(b). As
illustrated in the case law that follows, not only have the defendants
not restrained their victims in a physical manner, but in many
instances, the defendants at no point come into physical contact with
the victims of the robberies.74 The circuit courts in this camp therefore
apply an interpretation of the Guidelines consistent with constructive
physical restraint, in that any actual restraint tends to be induced by the
victim’s perception of coercion or fear of harm.
A.

Fourth Circuit

In United States v. Dimache,75 the defendant entered a bank and
approached a teller under what appeared to be typical banking and
transactional business.76 After the bank teller’s drawer was open,
Dimache forcibly jumped over the counter “brandishing” a firearm.77
Once behind the counter, Dimache pointed the firearm at two bank
tellers and ordered them to get down on the floor. 78 “[Dimache] told
them to be quiet, stating if they were not ‘[y]ou know what will
happen.’”79 Dimache was eventually apprehended and pled guilty. 80
In the pre-sentencing phase of the trial, a probation officer applied
three separate sentencing enhancements, one of which was the
74

See generally United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2006).
75
665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011).
76
Id. at 604.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id., see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 cmt. 6 application (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2021) (Dimache’s words of “you know what will happen” coupled
with a pointed pistol would be enough to satisfy the enhancement for death threats
under subsection (b)(2)(F), yet it was not applied.).
80
Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604.
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enhancement for physical restraint. 81 The probation department’s
reasoning behind the imposition of the physical restraint enhancement
was that during the commission of the robbery, Dimache “used a
firearm to threaten the victim tellers and force them to lie on the
ground, thereby restraining their movements.” 82 On appeal, Dimache
contended that physical restraint required more than pointing a gun and
ordering the victims to the floor. 83 The Fourth Circuit rejected
Dimache’s argument on the ground that the definition of “physically
restrained” is “’the forcible restraint of the victim [such as] by being
tied, bound or locked up.’”84 Focusing on the words “such as,” the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the methods of physical restraint
enumerated in the Guidelines application was not an exhaustive list of
restraint possibilities.85 After defining physical restraint in broader
terms, the court then relied on the Seventh Circuit’s precedent, quoting
the essential characteristic of enhancement provision, “the deprivation
of a person’s ‘freedom of physical movement.’”86
B.

Tenth Circuit

In United States v. Miera,87 the co-defendants entered a bank
and ordered the occupants to put their hands in the air and not to
move.88 Miera’s brother and co-defendant stood at the entrance of the
bank pointing a firearm around the room continuing to order the
occupants not to move. 89 Miera approached the teller with his hand
under his clothing, which led the teller to believe he was carrying a
concealed firearm. 90 Miera then demanded money from the teller, to
which the teller complied, giving Miera about seven-thousand dollars
81

Id. at 605.
Id.
83
Id. at 606 (noting counsel for Dimache apparently applying a plain language
meaning to the enhancement provision).
84
Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. 1B1.1(L)) (emphasis added).
85
Id. at 609.
86
Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 620 F. 3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting
reliance on a circuit that no longer applies this method of restraint to trigger the
physical restrain sentencing enhancement).
87
539 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2008).
88
Id. at 1233.
89
Id.
90
Id.
82
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in cash.91 Miera and his co-defendant escaped but were later
apprehended by investigators, wherein two “air-powered pellet
pistols” were seized and identified as the weapons used in the
robbery.92 After Miera pled guilty to “one count of armed bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d),”93 the pre-sentence
report recommended his sentence be enhanced, in part, pursuant to
section (b)(4)(B).94 At sentencing, Miera contested the application of
the physical restraint sentencing enhancement, but the district court
found otherwise and sentenced Miera to a forty-six month
imprisonment.95 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit relied on its prior
holding in Fisher.96 Citing Fisher, the court reiterated that “[U.S.S.G.
§2B3.1(b)(4)(B)] is applicable when the defendant uses force to
impede others from interfering with commission of the offense.” 97
Further, the Tenth Circuit held that physical restraint occurs when a
victim is prevented from moving for purposes of facilitating the crime
and was not solely limited to circumstances where the defendant
physically touches the victim. 98 Additionally, the court looked to its
holding in United States v. Pearson99 to declare that the enhancement
is triggered “when the defendant uses force, including force by gun
point, to impede others from interfering with the commission of the
offense.”100 The Tenth Circuit recognized that Pearson instructed that
“something more” than a mere display of the firearm must be done to
trigger the enhancement. 101 The court concluded Miera and his codefendant’s actions of pointing the gun around the room while
demanding that no one move and simultaneously blocking the bank
door constituted the “something more” required to trigger the
enhancement provision.102

91

Id.
Id.
93
Id. at 1234.
94
Id. (showing a recommendation for the physical restraint enhancement provision).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1234; see United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 1997).
97
Miera, 539 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Fisher 132 F.3d at 1329).
98
Id. (citing Fisher 132 F.3d at 1329-30).
99
211 F.3d 524 (10th Cir. 2000).
100
Miera, 539 F.3d 1234 (quoting Pearson, 211 F.3d at 526).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1234-36.
92
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Eleventh Circuit

In United States v. Philips, 103 the defendant appealed his
sentence of 240 months which arose from his guilty plea for two
separate car-jackings and “brandishing” a firearm in furtherance of the
car-jackings.104 During the first carjacking giving rise to the sentence,
the defendant and his father approached the victim in a parking
complex.105 Both the defendant and his father were armed and
threatened the victim with their firearms before stealing the car. 106
Two days later, the defendant, his father, and two unindicted coconspirators entered a parking lot and pulled up behind a car that was
occupied by the three victims. 107 The defendant and the two unindicted
co-conspirators approached the victims’ vehicle and the defendant
pressed a firearm against the driver’s chest. 108 The defendant ordered
the driver-victim to give him the keys to the vehicle, while one of the
co-conspirators held a firearm to the chest of the passenger-victim.109
The defendant and two co-conspirators fled the scene in the stolen
vehicle while the defendant’s father fled in the vehicle all four had
arrived in.110 During pre-sentencing, the court imposed the two level
enhancement arising under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), finding that the
defendants’ action of pressing a firearm against the victim’s chest
qualified as physical restraint. 111 On appeal, the defendants’ sole
contention was that the district court’s application of the sentencing
enhancement was incorrect. 112 The circuit court revisited their prior
interpretation of the physical restraint sentencing enhancement.113 The
court emphasized that the previous clarification of the sentencing
enhancement in question identified the words “such as” in the
820 F. App’x 966 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 967 (“brandishing a firearm” is a separate sentencing enhancement arising
under 2B3.1.(b)(2)(C): “if a firearm was brandished or possessed, increase by 5
levels[.]”).
105
Philips, 820 F. App’x at 966.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 968; see United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
103
104
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definition for “physically restrained” as a modifier.114 Further, the
court explained that this modification “indicates that the illustrations
of physical restraint are listed by way of example rather than
limitation.”115 This interpretation of the sentencing enhancement
allows any conduct which “ensure[s] the victims’ compliance and
prevent[s] them from leaving” to trigger the enhancement. 116 In
United States v. Victor,117 the court determined that the defendants’
actions of pointing an assault rifle magazine at a bank teller prevented
her escape.118 Reading the two cases together, the Philips court
determined the defendant had physically restrained the victim of the
second carjacking by “pressing a gun against her chest and ordering
her to hand over her car keys.”119
D.

First Circuit

In United States v. Wallace,120 the defendant’s brother entered
a licensed firearms dealership posing as a customer interested in
purchasing a special type of ammunition clip. 121 Once the store
assistant retrieved the keys to open the locked case, defendant Wallace
entered the store “brandishing” a firearm. 122 Wallace and his codefendant, who was also now brandishing a firearm, pointed their
weapons at the assistant and owner, ordered them not to move and open
the locked firearms case. 123 The pair then fled the store with six stolen
high caliber handguns.124 After the store owner identified Wallace, the
police conducted surveillance at his apartment ten days after the
robbery had taken place. 125 Police arrested Wallace’s co-defendant
“Nickoyan” pursuant to a search of the apartment wherein five of the
six stolen firearms were found, as well as the firearm used by Wallace
114

Id. (quoting Jones, 32 F.3d at 1518).
Id. (quoting Jones, 32 F.3d at 1518).
116
Id. (quoting Jones, 32 F.3d at 1519).
117
719 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013).
118
Id.
119
Philips, 820 F. App’x at 968.
120
461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006).
121
Id. at 20.
122
Id.; supra text accompanying note 104.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
115
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in the commission of the robbery. 126 Wallace was not apprehended by
the police until July of 2004 but his indictment was almost identical to
his co-defendant’s, with the addition of sentencing enhancements.127
During the sentencing hearing, the government made
recommendations for a sentence which fell within the middle of the
appropriate range of the Guidelines. 128 Despite the apparent leniency
advanced by the government, the district court rejected the
recommendation and imposed a twenty-five-year sentence.129 Wallace
made numerous evidentiary and legal error challenges.130 Noting the
proximity of time between Wallace’s sentencing and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker, the First Circuit recognized that Wallace’s
sentence did not reflect the application of subsequent case law. 131 This
circuit indicated that proper sentencing procedures under the
Guidelines would entail determining the correct sentencing range as a
starting point.132 Then, after evaluating factors set forth in the
Guidelines, the sentencing court must determine if the sentence is
appropriate regardless of whether it is above, within, or below the
Guidelines range.133 Here, the court pointed out that the district court
erred by turning to factors as grounds for departure from Guidelines,
which were not themselves listed in the Guidelines, without
determining what sentence would be consistent with those factors. 134
On appeal, Wallace argued the pre-sentencing report’s
recommended enhancement provisions were in error.135 Specifically
with reference to section (b)(2)(B), Wallace contended that because
neither he nor the co-defendant made physical contact with the store
owner or assistant, nor did they force them into a separate and confined
space, they never physically restrained them. 136 Looking to the
126

Id.
Id. at 21.
128
Id. at 24.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 25-29.
131
Id. at 31; see Booker, 543 U.S. 220; see also United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440
F.3d 514 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Scherrer, 444 F.3d 91 (1st. Cir. 2006).
132
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 32 (citing United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 203-04 (1st
Cir. 2004)).
133
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 32.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 30.
136
Id. at 33.
127
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application notes of the Guidelines, the First Circuit defined physically
restrained as the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied,
bound, or locked up.137 Using the reasoning later applied by the Fourth
Circuit in Dimache, the First Circuit found that the examples listed by
the Guidelines were not exhaustive, as stated in DeLuca.138 In United
States v. DeLuca, the court held that the physical restraint enhancement
was appropriate where a victim’s freedom of movement was restricted
by the defendant’s blocking of egress.139 The First Circuit gave
credence to other circuits’ caution against an overly broad reading of
“physical restraint.”140 Still, this circuit focused on the prevention of
movement by use of a firearm rather than true restraint, thus taking a
position consistent with what would later become sister circuits. 141
Applying this standard, the court determined that blocking the store
assistant’s escape by method of a firearm constituted physical
restraint.142
E.

Ninth Circuit

In United States v. Thompson,143 the defendant and two
accomplices entered a California bank while a third accomplice waited
in the getaway vehicle outside. 144 Defendant Thompson and one
accomplice were armed while the other accomplice who entered the
bank was not.145 While entering the bank, one of the armed defendants
pushed his firearm into the back of a customer who was exiting, forcing
the customer back inside the bank. 146 The customer was forced to the
ground and held down by one of the defendants, who placed their foot
Id. at 33 (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2021)).
138
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 33 (quoting United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 39 (1st
Cir. 1998).
139
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34 (citing Deluca, 137 F.3d at 39).
140
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34; accord United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v.
Anglin, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999)).
141
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34; accord United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467 (4th Cir.
1999); United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 1997).
142
Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34.
143
109 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1997).
144
Id. at 640.
145
Id.
146
Id.
137
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on the customer’s back.147 The other defendant went to the bank’s
customer service manager and demanded the vault keys. 148 After
obtaining the keys, the same defendant repeatedly forced the employee
to the floor and back to her feet while simultaneously threatening to
kill her.149 At around the same time, the other armed defendant
approached the branch manager at gun point, forced her to the vault
area, and yelled profanities at her. 150 The branch manager later
testified that she believed that the defendant would kill her. 151 The
court determined that the three separate acts of holding down the
customer, the customer service manager, and the branch manager were
committed by the two armed defendants, Thompson and Doe,
however, which one committed which act never became clear at
trial.152 The court concluded that defendant Thompson had committed
at least one of the acts by recognizing the physical impossibility of one
person holding two separate bank employees down simultaneously. 153
During sentencing, the district court adjusted Thompson’s
sentence upward because his acts were reasonably foreseeable and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 154 The Ninth Circuit determined that the
two-level upward adjustment was justified due to the district court’s
finding that Thompson physically restrained either the customer or the
branch manager.155 The court compared Thompson’s actions with the
actions of the defendant in U.S. v. Foppe,156 where the defendant
controlled bank customers during a robbery by convincing them that a
hairbrush was a firearm and dragging the customers around the bank
in furtherance of the crime. 157 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Thompson’s actions constituted a forcible and substantial restraint on
the victim.158 The court also addressed material differences between
the actions of the defendant in Foppe and the defendant in Thompson.
147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
993 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993).
157
Id. at 1448.
158
Thompson, 109 F.3d at 641.
148
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In Thompson, the defendant: (1) used an actual firearm, rather than
convincing victims a reasonably safe object was a firearm; and (2)
never came into physical contact with his victim. 159 The court noted
that the natural reaction a person has when being ordered to do
something at gunpoint is to say that the person was forced. 160 Although
the court recognized that a potential argument could be made that a
threat of force rather than force itself was used, it ultimately relied on
the example of “locked-up” in the application note to support its
holding that Thompson did in fact physically restrain his victim. 161
The Ninth Circuit agreed that, because locking a victim up could occur
without ever touching the victim or the victim ever seeing the assailant,
holding a victim at gunpoint constituted physical restraint. 162 Further,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that this was “the more natural and
realistic interpretation of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).”163 However, in later case
law, the Ninth Circuit refined their standard to take a position more
consistent with the second camp. 164
The above cases illustrate the theory of constructive physical
restraint. Under this theory, the enhancement can be triggered without
ever touching the victim(s) or even moving them from where they were
standing in the premises at the time the robbery started. In the Fourth
Circuit, the defendant was subject to the sentencing enhancement
based on making demands.165 Rather than force the victims to the floor
by physical force, the defendant made demands while pointing a
firearm at his victims. 166 This suggests that the victim’s reactions to
words during the course of the robbery plays a key role in whether or
not the enhancement is triggered. In the Tenth Circuit, the court
allowed a definition of physical restraint which required no physicality
to trigger the enhancement suggesting that physical restraint
encompasses other types of restraint. 167 The Tenth Circuit agreed that
“something more” than waving a firearm was required, but still held
that verbal threats accompanied with a firearm can qualify as the
159

Id.
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 641-42.
163
Id. at 642.
164
See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
165
See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 2011).
166
Id.
167
United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
160
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“something more” to sufficiently trigger the enhancement. 168 The
Tenth Circuit suggested that even a robber’s positioning within the
targeted business may play a role in triggering the enhancement. 169 In
the First Circuit, the court appeared to recognize potential issues with
an overly broad definition of “physical restraint” yet still qualified the
brandishing of a firearm coupled with threats as sufficient to trigger
the enhancement. 170 In the Ninth Circuit, the defendant appeared to
engage in conduct that would sufficiently meet the physical restraint
requirements of opposed circuits. 171 However, the court’s analysis
focused on a victims’ natural reaction to having a firearm pointed at
them accompanied by demands.172 This suggests that a victim’s
internal mental state is relevant to whether the victim was physically
restrained. Most surprisingly, in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant
was subjected to the physical restraint sentencing enhancement for
threats accompanied with the firearm despite the purpose of the threats
being to remove the occupant from a vehicle, which was the target of
the robbery.173 This indicates that physical restraint can occur even
when a robber is removing a victim from a location rather than locking
him away. It also indicates that the purpose of threat, such as
furthering a carjacking in Philips plays a role in whether threats can
constitute physical restraint. 174
Following this logic, the sister circuits may potentially adopt a
standard which allows for the sentencing enhancements application
where the offender actually removes occupants from the bank or other
business being robbed. In sum, the first camp’s reasoning places
reliance on the victims’ subjective feelings and their natural reactions
to having a firearm pointed at them during the course of the robbery.
This suggests that mental or psychological restraint would be a more
proper term for these circuits to adopt. However, no sentencing
enhancement for psychological coercion or restraint exists at this time.
A positive effect of the broader definition of physical restraint is that
the sentencing enhancement can have a higher rate of deterrence. If
168

Id. at 1234 (United States v. Pearson, 211 F.3d 524 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Miera, 539 F.3d at 1233.
170
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 34 (1st Cir. 2006).
171
United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1997).
172
Id. at 641.
173
United States v. Philips, 820 F. App’x 966, 967 (11th Cir. 2020).
174
Id.
169
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offenders are aware that minor changes in behavior can significantly
increase or decrease their time behind bars, they may be persuaded to
use less violent tactics during the commission of a robbery or forego
committing the crime entirely. On the other hand, this broad definition
of physical restraint subjects’ offenders in different geographical areas
to greater disproportionalities during sentencing. A defendant who
commits a robbery in the Carolinas, Colorado, Maine, or Georgia can
face significantly more time for a robbery identical to one committed
in New York.175 The following section introduces the case law from
the second camp and its application of the physical restraint sentencing
enhancement.176
IV.

CIRCUITS THAT APPLY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING OF
PHYSICAL RESTRAINT

The second camp of circuit courts has taken a narrower
approach to applying the physical restraint sentencing enhancement.
Under this stricter approach, pointing a firearm paired with threats is
insufficient to trigger the enhancement. Rather, the “something more”
referred to by the Tenth Circuit requires an element of physicality to
sufficiently trigger the enhancement. 177 Despite a narrower approach
to the definition of physical restraint, only one of the circuits below
has adopted a test where the defendants conduct is measured to
determine whether application of the enhancement is appropriate. 178

175

Map of Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United
States
District
Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf
(showing North Carolina, South Carolina, Colorado, Maine, and Georgia within the
jurisdiction of circuit courts that apply constructive physical restraint, and New York
falling within the jurisdiction of a circuit court that applies a plain language
interpretation to physical restraint).
176
Infra Part IV.
177
United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
178
United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020).
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Ninth Circuit

In United States v. Parker,179 the defendant gang member was
involved in a series of robberies of federally insured banks. 180 The
physical restraint sentencing enhancement was applied to counts two
and four of the defendant’s indictment which were both for armed bank
robberies.181 The defendant challenged application of the physical
restraint enhancement provisions which were triggered by accomplice
liability.182 Regarding Count two, accomplice, Evan Baylon pulled a
bank teller off the floor by her hair. 183 Since Baylon’s actions were
reasonably foreseeable by defendant Parker and in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken bank robbery, Parker was liable for the acts of his
accomplices.184 Count four involved a robbery during which a robber
pointed a firearm at the bank teller and demanded she get down on the
floor.185 In differentiating between the two separate circumstances, the
Ninth Circuit identified a sustained focus the defendant undergoes in
cases where the enhancement is applied. 186 This sustained focus
allows the offender to restrain the victim long enough to move or direct
the victim to another part of the premises where the offense is taking
place.187 The Ninth Circuit commented on the congressional intent of
the enhancement provision: “[i]t is therefore likely that Congress
meant for something more than briefly pointing a gun at a victim and
commanding her once to get down to constitute physical restraint,
given that nearly all armed bank robberies will presumably involve
such acts.”188 In applying the “sustained focus” standard, the Ninth
Circuit held the enhancement was appropriate under Count two, but
not appropriate under Count four.189 Here, the Ninth Circuit appeared
179

241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1117.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1118.
183
Id.
184
Id. (“U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(b) (2000) holds a defendant accountable at sentencing for
all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of a jointly
undertaken criminal activity.”) citing United States v. Carter, 219 F.3d 863, 868 (9th
Cir. 2000).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 1118-19.
189
Id. at 1119.
180
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to take a middle ground as to qualifying acts which trigger the physical
restraint sentencing enhancement.
B.

Seventh Circuit

In United States v. Herman,190 the defendant was invited to the
home of Jacob Kirk (Kirk) and Kirk’s mother, Samantha Daniels
(Daniels).191 Upon entering, the defendant noticed that Daniels had a
handgun partially protruding from her purse. 192 The defendant was
able to obtain control of Daniel’s firearm, before pulling out his own
handgun and commencing the robbery. 193 The defendant pointed one
of the handguns at Kirk and Daniels and ordered them not to move
before fleeing from the home. 194 When Kirk and Daniels pursued the
defendant, he spun around and fired a round with the stolen handgun
which narrowly missed Kirk’s head. 195 At sentencing, the district court
applied the Robbery base offense level of twenty, plus an additional
ten levels for three separate enhancements but subtracted three levels
due to the defendant having accepted responsibility. 196
The
combination of the applicable adjustments, including an enhancement
of two levels for physically restraining the victims, left the defendant
with an offense level of twenty-seven.197 On appeal, the defendant
requested a remand for sentencing on the ground that the physical
restraint enhancement was improper. 198
The court began its analysis by recognizing the circuit split and
listing the individual circuits by its respective camp: the Fourth, Tenth,
First and Eleventh Circuits’ holding that pointing a gun and
commanding a person not to move is enough to trigger the
enhancement compared to the Ninth, D.C., Second and Fifth Circuits,
190

930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 873.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 874. Here, defendant Herman received a 7-level enhancement for
discharging a firearm during the course of the robbery, a 1-level enhancement for
taking a firearm during the course of the robbery and a 2-level enhancement for
physically restraining the victims. Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
191
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which require more than pointing a gun and making demands to trigger
the enhancement. 199 The court then reviewed its precedent from
United States v. Doubet. 200 In Doubet, an offender was subjected to
the sentencing enhancement when he used a firearm to herd bank
employees into a back room. 201 The Doubet court determined that the
defendant’s actions were consistent with “lock[ing them] up” and thus
fell within the scope of the enhancement at the time the case was
decided.202 In Herman, the court spoke to the limiting principle it
sought to establish in Doubet.203 Despite Doubet imposing the
sentencing enhancement, the court mentioned that “herding victims
into a defined area” would not trigger the enhancement in every
circumstance, but that this limiting principle served to prevent the
enhancement’s application in nearly all armed robberies. 204 The
Herman court used its previous holding to advance a position that the
sentencing enhancement was designed to punish physical restraint
which rules out application where the victim’s restraint comes from
psychological coercion instilled by threat of harm. 205 Further, the court
admitted that its previous “middle position…may have covered too
much conduct.”206 Finally, Herman established that psychological
coercion is insufficient to trigger the enhancement for physical
restraint and found it inapplicable to the defendant. 207
C.

D.C. Circuit

In United States v. Drew,208 the defendant’s estranged wife had
a protective order against him at the time of the crime, precipitating
invocation of the sentencing guideline in question. 209 This protective
order arose from previous acts of physical abuse and was conditioned

199

Id.at 874-75.
969 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1992).
201
Id. at 346.
202
Id.
203
Herman, 930 F.3d at 875; accord Doubet, 969 F.2d at 346.
204
Doubet, 969 F.2d at 346.
205
Herman, 930 F.3d at 875-76.
206
Id. at 876.
207
Id. at 877.
208
200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
209
Id. at 874.
200

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 16

478

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

to run for one year.210 Under the terms of the protective order, the
defendant was to retrieve his belongings from the familial residence
with a police escort and vacate. 211 Further, defendant was ordered to
stay at least 100 feet away from his wife and children, and could not
communicate with her unless in the presence of counsel.212 In
violation of this order, defendant contacted his wife expressing a need
for help and voicing suicidal ideations. 213 After the defendant’s wife
suggested he seek medical assistance and voiced her intent to hang up,
the defendant made claims that he would do something drastic. 214
Within minutes of the conversation, the defendant broke into the home
by shattering a window.215 This alerted his wife, who called 911 and
hid in a bedroom closet.216 The defendant made his way to the
bedroom and upon finding his wife in the closet pointed a shotgun at
her.217 The 911 call picked up the exchange of words between
defendant and his wife, indicating his intent to commit murder. 218 The
defendant directed his wife into the upstairs hallway where they were
met by their children.219 The defendant pulled the trigger of his
firearm; however, it did not discharge.220 Seeing this as an opportunity
to intervene, the defendant’s wife and children jumped on him and
attempted to remove the shotgun from his possession.221 The arresting
officer arrived during the struggle, subdued the defendant, and placed
him under arrest.222
After extensive plea deal negotiations, defendant pled guilty
and was sentenced to eighty months followed by three years of

210

Id.
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id at 875.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. (When defendant’s wife tried to put on her shoes, the defendant stated, “[y]ou
don’t need shoes where you are going.” Id. at 875. Had this been said to the victim
in the course of a robbery, this conduct would likely be sufficient to trigger the
enhancement for threat of death.).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
211
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supervised release. 223 In determining the defendant’s base level
offense, the court applied the cross-reference sections for the firearm
charges which resulted in the base level offense for attempted first
degree murder.224 Additionally, the district court added a two-level
adjustment for physical restraint. 225
Challenging his sentence, the defendant made two arguments
relating to the Guidelines. 226 First, he alleged an improper use of the
cross-referencing sections of the Guidelines in an attempt to lower his
base level offense of twenty-seven for first degree murder, to
seventeen under the section of the Guidelines covering unlawful
possession of firearms.227 The court responded that because the
unlawfully possessed firearm was used in an attempt to commit
another offense, that the section providing guidance for attempted
offenses was applicable. 228 Under this alternate section, the sentencing
judge is instructed to apply the base level offense listed under the
provision covering the substantive offense which was attempted. 229
Thus, because the unlawful possession of a firearm was used in
connection with an attempted first degree murder, the base level
offense for first degree murder was applicable. 230
Second, the defendant contested the validity of the physical
restraint enhancement under these facts indicating that “he did not
physically touch his wife and any physical restraint was part of the
offense itself.”231 In response to this argument, the government argued
for applicability of the enhancement by way of constructive physical
restraint, in that ordering his estranged wife around the house by
223

Id. at 876.
Id. The effect of the cross-reference section in this context allowed the
prosecution to set the base level offense at a term consistent with first degree murder.
Under the cross-reference sections, a defendant charged with the underlying crime
of unlawful possession of a weapon will be sentenced under the substantive crime in
which he used the unlawfully possessed weapon. Here, although the defendant pled
guilty to the unlawful weapons possession charges, he was charged with first degree
murder in that he used the unlawfully possessed weapon with intent to commit first
degree murder.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 877-80.
227
Id. at 878-79.
228
Id. at 878.
229
Id. at 877-79.
230
Id. at 879.
231
Id. at 880.
224
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gunpoint triggered the enhancement provision. 232 The court looked to
the application notes under the applicable provision for first degree
murder which referenced the commentary notes for physical restraint
under the robbery provision. 233 Although recognizing the words “such
as” precluded the methods of restraint provided as examples from
being a full and complete list, the court concluded imposition of this
enhancement provision requires restraint through bodily contact or
confinement of the victim. 234 The court also noted the Ninth Circuit,
as the only circuit at that time, to apply the constructive definition of
physical restraint, and that all other circuits required at least “some
type of confinement accompanying the forced movement at
gunpoint.”235 Finally, the court reasoned that applying a constructive
definition to the meaning of physical restraint within the Guidelines
would effectively trigger the enhancement in “almost any attempted
murder because presumably any victim would feel restrained if
directed to move at gunpoint.”236
D.

Fifth Circuit

In United States v. Garcia,237 the defendant and two codefendants walked into a gun store, wearing ski masks and carrying
firearms.238 While one defendant held his firearm to the employees’
head, the two other defendants guarded the store entrance with a

232

Id.
Id.
234
Id. (Although decided over a decade later, the Fourth Circuit came to a similar
logical conclusion: the use of “such as” meant the means of physical restraint listed
by example were not an exhaustive list. However, unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit, used this linguistic logic to broaden its understanding and scope of physical
restraint in the context of the sentencing provisions); Drew, 969 F.2d at 880; cf.
United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011).
235
Id.; cf. United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that forcible movement at gunpoint constitutes physical
restraint triggering the enhancement provision. Notably, the Ninth Circuit also
determined the examples of physical restraint listed in the commentary were
illustrative and therefore did not preclude physical restraint by other, apparently more
constructive means.).
236
Id.
237
857 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2017).
238
Id. at 710.
233
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firearm and broke the glass weapons case to steal firearms. 239 Upon
breaking the glass case, another employee was alerted and rushed to
the counter where he took cover and loaded his own pistol. 240 The
defendants and the armed employee exchanged gunfire during which
the employee was shot in the ankle. 241 This exchange ended with the
defendants fleeing from the store with a total of nine stolen firearms. 242
The defendant was charged and later pled guilty to one count
of robbery under the Hobbs Act, 243 and one count of discharging a
firearm in the commission of a violent crime. 244 The probation
department opted to impose the physical restraint enhancement despite
objections by both the government and defense counsel.245 In support,
the probation department attached an addendum to its report which
distinguished the current case from the precedent. 246 Agreeing with
the presentencing report, the trial court sentenced the defendant to
fifty-one months for the Hobbs Act robbery with the physical restraint
enhancement and one-hundred-and-twenty months for the firearms
charge.247
On appeal, the defendant challenged the application of the
physical restraint enhancement which the government was now
prepared to support.248 Similar to circuit courts that have taken
divergent positions on the meaning of physical restraint, the Fifth
Circuit focused on the words “such as” under the definition of physical

239

Id.
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). This criminal statute penalizes interference with
commerce by use of threats or violence. Id. Here, defendant Garcia was interfering
with the commerce of the commodity of firearms.
244
Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under this criminal statute, which is now held to be
unconstitutional by many courts, a defendant who uses a firearm in connection with
a violent crime faces additional sentencing depending on the extent of the use of the
firearm in furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime. Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.; see United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1998) (showing
Fifth Circuit precedent that physical restraint requires “either the physical holding of
the victim or the confining of the victim in some manner coupled with a threat of
violence.”).
248
Id.
240
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restraint in the Guidelines commentary notes. 249 Arriving at the same
conclusion as circuit courts from both camps, the Fifth Circuit declared
that “such as” precluded the methods of physical restraint listed in the
commentary notes from being the only ways in which physical
restraint can occur. 250 The court then looked to various circuit courts
for their interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement
provisions.251 Here, the court found the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation
of physical restraint and applicable situations to be overly broad as
compared to their own case law.252 Specifically, the court held that
“merely brandishing a weapon cannot support a [physical restraint
enhancement] otherwise, [the] enhancement would be warranted every
time an armed robber entered a bank.” 253 The court explained that
threats not to move are implicit in armed robberies and are not
distinguishable from the typical armed robbery. 254 In furtherance of
the court’s desire to move away from a constructive physical restraint
standard, the Fifth Circuit identified “restraint” as being a condition
which can be modified by multiple adjectives such as physical, or
mental or moral.255 In reliance on the Second Circuit’s holding in
Anglin, the Fifth Circuit held that brandishing a firearm and ordering
people not to move, without more, was insufficient to trigger the
enhancement.256 As a final matter, the Fifth Circuit noted that it had
little doubt the victims of Garcia’s robbery felt restrained; however,
the court indicated the victims were not physically restrained such as
someone who is “tied, bound, or locked up.”257
249

Id. at 712.
Id.
251
Id. at 712-13; see United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2009)
(upholding an enhancement for physical restraint where the defendant moved bank
employees into a vault at gun point “under circumstances clearly implying they
should remain there or risk physical harm.”). Id. at 721; see also United States v.
Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1233-36 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding enhancement for
physical restraint where the defendant blocked the bank door while brandishing a
firearm, which “had the effect of physically restraining everyone in [the defendant’s]
presence.”).
252
Garcia, 853 F.3d at 713.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. (citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999).
257
Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021)).
250
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Second Circuit

In United States v. Taylor,258 the defendants committed a series
of cell phone robberies, where co-defendant Oneal acted as if he had a
firearm by using certain hand motions. 259 Over the course of three
robberies and one attempted robbery, defendant Oneal used the
leverage gained by pretending to have a firearm to force the employees
of the targeted stores into different rooms.260 During sentencing, the
district court made a discretionary downward adjustment and several
adjustments based on Oneal’s criminal history. 261 Oneal’s final
sentence was eighty-four months.262 Here, the district court applied
the physical restraint sentencing enhancement based on its reading of
Anglin and the defendant’s actions of pushing the victims into the
backrooms of the targeted cell phone stores.263
On appeal, Oneal challenged the district court’s application of
the physical restraint enhancement provision. 264 In its analysis, the
Second Circuit noted its previous caution of interpreting “physically
restrained” in a broad and expansive manner which would apply to
most robbery cases.265 Drawing on its opinion in Anglin,266 Rosario267
and Paul268 and the plain language interpretation of the Guidelines, the
court identified a three part test. 269 First, the court noted that
“restraint” is a noun modified by the adjective “physical,” meaning
brandishing a firearm and telling people to get down and not move was
insufficient to trigger the enhancement provision. 270 Although the
258

961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 71.
260
Id. at 71-72.
261
Id. at 74.
262
Id.
263
Id. (“[T]he district court found it applicable referring to our decision in Anglin,
reasoning that, by ‘pushing people into back rooms,’ Oneal ‘did far more’ than the
defendant in Anglin, who told the victims to get down on the floor and not move.”)
citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999).
264
Taylor, 961 F.3d at 77.
265
Id. at 77-78.
266
Anglin, 169 F.3d 154.
267
7 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1993).
268
904 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2018).
269
Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78.
270
Id. (“Accordingly, we have held that ‘displaying a gun and telling people to get
down and not move, without more, is insufficient to trigger the ‘physical restraint’
259

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

31

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 16

484

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

court noted the precedent of other circuits and their application of the
enhancement provision where the psychological coercion caused by
the presence of a firearm was enough to trigger the enhancement, it
chose not to follow these circuits.271 Second, the court distinguished
qualifying levels of physicality which would constitute the “restraint”
necessary for proper application of the enhancement provision. 272
Specifically, the court held that to qualify as “restraint,” the physical
force must facilitate the commission of the offense and that physical
contact alone would not qualify. 273 Further, the court noted that the
physical restraint must “facilitate, [rather than] constitute the
commission of the offense.”274 Finally, the Second Circuit held that
the restraint must facilitate the crime, rather than be constitutive of the
robbery.275
The overarching principle detailed in the cases above appears
to be the avoidance of a definition of physical restraint which would
make the sentencing enhancement applicable in nearly all armed
robberies.276 The courts in the second camp have drawn a line that
differentiates cases of psychological coercion from cases of physical
restraint as a means of limiting the enhancement provision’s
application. By limiting the interpretation of physical restraint to cases
where the victim is truly physically restrained, the courts have engaged
in a process of applying the black letter law of the sentencing
Guidelines where appropriate. Most noteworthy is the Second
Circuit’s reading and development of its three-part test. The court’s
recognition that a broad definition of physical restraint would make the
sentencing enhancement applicable in all robberies, excluding
unoccupied premises, has advanced a position most consistent with the

enhancement,’ because, while brandishing a firearm may cause victims to feel
restraint, it does not physically restrain or immobilize them.”). Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id. (citing United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321(2d Cir. 1993); accord United
States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that “the essential character
of conduct that is subject to the physical-restraint Guideline is depriving a person of
his physical movement.”). Id. at 875.
275
Id.
276
See Taylor, 961 F.3d 68; Herman, 930 F.3d 872; United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d
708 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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sentencing Guidelines’ primary objectives: reducing sentencing
disparities across the nation.277
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

“Words should mean something[.]”278 The exclusion of
psychological coercion as a separately enumerated sentencing
enhancement advances the position of the second camp. Had the
sentencing commission considered such conduct sufficiently
aggravating as to warrant enumeration of a specific enhancement
provision it would be included in the original Guidelines. However, it
is evident the sentencing commission did not intend psychological
coercion to trigger an enhancement for physical acts. The significant
portion of the statute, which illuminates the circuit courts’ point of
divergence, is the use of the phrase “such as.” 279 Courts of both camps
have identified that these two words alone signify the examples of
physical restraint listed in the commentary notes, are mentioned by
way of example, and do not constitute an exhaustive list.280 Under this
interpretation, the circuit courts of the first camp have read “physical
restraint” expansively and have applied it in situations where the
defendant’s conduct resembles psychological coercion. Conversely,
courts of the second camp have concluded that although the list does
not preclude a finding of other examples of physical restraint, the
restraint required to trigger the enhancement provision must in fact be
physical.
The first question in a court’s statutory construction is to
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; [and] the court…must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”281 Where congressional intent cannot

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 1, Pt. A, Subpt. 1, § 3, The Basic
Approach: Policy Statement (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
278
Herman, 930 F.3d at 876.
279
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2b3.1 cmt. background n.6 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021); see United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see
also United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 2011).
280
Drew, 200 F.3d at 880; Dimache, 665 F.3d at 606.
281
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738
277
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be ascertained from a “plain language” reading, the courts engage in
statutory construction through the use of the canons of construction. 282
The canons of construction can be separated generally into three
separate approaches: (1) legislative intent; (2) textual meaning; or (3)
pragmatic assessment of institutional, textual and contextual factors;
the dynamic approach.283 Still, the canons of construction “are no
more than rules of thumb in determining the meaning of the law” 284
and generally “there is no hierarchy of the canons” 285 so long as the
court starts with a plain language reading. Although useful, the lack
of hierarchy among the canons of construction potentially gives a
presiding judge great deference in assigning conduct to statutory
language. Despite the useful and often necessary effects of the canons
of construction, this Note supports the position that § 2B3.1 (b)(4)(B)
does not require interpretation past a plain language reading nor is the
first camp’s interpretation as simplistic and inconsequential as the law
school exercise of “No Cars in the Park.” 286 The use of the word
“physical” prior to “restraint” suggests that the restraint must in fact
involve a physical element. 287 Some courts have acknowledged that
“[T]he victim’s reaction does not determine whether there is or is not
(2020) (“This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public
meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.”).
282
Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 339,
342 (2012) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 69 (11th ed. 2006)).
Art’ is defined as ‘skill acquired by experience, study, or observation.’
Nothing better describes the act of lawyers and judges attempting to
discern the legislative intent of a statute. For it is through the subordination
of the judiciary to the legislature that our laws are assured their democratic
pedigree. Yet, many times the text may be unclear in the context of a
particular fact pattern, and a statute’s meaning must be drawn from other
sources. Thus, the court and lawyers must follow the legislative command
by applying the statute’s language or referring to the legislative intent or
purpose as discerned through the legislative history or canons of
construction.

Id.
283

Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343.
285
Id. at 344.
286
See generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L REV. 593, 607 (1958) (showing a classic Hart-Fuller debate of a statutory
interpretation problem most law students will at some point encounter; the legal
meaning of “No Vehicles in the Park”.).
287
See United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
284
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physical restraint.”288 Although restraint may have occurred, a
victim’s physical response to the defendant’s verbal coercion falls
outside the scope of physical restraint.
This circuit split could be resolved with an amendment to the
Guidelines, to specifically include a “psychological coercion”
enhancement. Since the case law is already well developed, the
drafters of such an amendment would have the benefit of choosing
language that is consistent with existing law. This amendment would
enable prosecutors to adequately address new cases involving
psychological coercion of the victims of robberies. The proposed
amendment could be enumerated under a currently fictitious
subsection “2B3.1(b)(4)(C)” which would immediately follow the
physical restraint sentencing enhancement. The proposed language
would read as follows: “(C) if any person was subjected to
psychological coercion to facilitate commission of the offense, or to
facilitate escape, increase by [x] levels.” Of course, the sentencing
enhancements are incomplete without examples giving the judicial
system a starting point from which to begin its interpretive analyses.
The proposed commentary background notes would also include a
brief description of examples which constitute psychological coercion
sufficient to trigger the proposed enhancement. Such language could
be as follows: “‘The guideline provides an enhancement for robberies
when a victim was’ subjected to psychological coercion by use of
dangerous instrumentalities.”289
This amendment would effectively resolve the circuit split and
differentiate cases of physical restraint and psychological coercion.
Over time, case law would make this differentiation clearer and define
concrete examples of physical restraint as compared to psychological
coercion. Several sentencing enhancements already exist which could
adequately punish the behavior outlined in this Note.
Subsections §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), (E) and (F) of the Guidelines
adds a 4-level enhancement “if a dangerous weapon was otherwise
used,”290 adds a 3-level enhancement “if a dangerous weapon was
brandished or possessed,”291 or adds a 2-level enhancement “if a threat
288

Id.
Quoting in part U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2B3.1 cmt. background
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
290
Id. at § (b)(2)(D).
291
Id. at § (b)(2)(E).
289
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of death was made[.]”292 Reading these enhancements together one
could very reasonably argue that pointing a firearm and making
demands would trigger § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) or (E) in concert with §
2B3.1(b)(2)(F).293 For example, an offender walks into a bank with a
firearm thus triggering subsection (D) or (E) or both. The offender
then points the firearm at a bank teller and makes a statement such as
“give me the money or else” thereby triggering subsection (F). Under
the commentary notes, examples of threats of death are provided:
“[g]ive me your money or else (where the defendant draws his hand
across his throat in a slashing motion)[.]” 294 However, the final
sentence of the commentary notes states that “[t]he court should
consider that the intent of this provision is to provide an increased
offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that
would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, a
fear of death.”295 Unlike the commentary and background notes for
the physical restraint sentencing enhancement, the guidance provided
by the sentencing commission suggests that application of this
enhancement depends on the victim’s reaction to an offender’s
conduct. It is fair to assume that reasonable people would be instilled
with a fear of death from having a firearm pointed at them. This
enhancement also directly lends itself to the psychological coercion
currently being assigned to the physical restraint enhancement in
circuits that have adopted constructive physical restraint.
Notably, the prime statutory limitation imposed on these
enhancements is “that the cumulative adjustments from (2) and (3)
shall not exceed 11 levels.”296 Subsection three of § 2B3.1 deals with
enhancements related to injuries sustained by the victim during the
course of the robbery. 297 The largest enhancement arises under §
2B3.1(b)(3)(C) where an offender faces an enhancement of 6-levels
for inflicting “Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury.”298
However, under the example above, the fictitious offender would very
likely trigger a 6-level enhancement for using a firearm,299 and/or a 5292

Id. at § (b)(2)(F).
Id. at §§ (b)(2)(D)(E)(F).
294
Id. at § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6.
295
Id.
296
Id. at § (b)(3).
297
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(3).
298
Id. at § (b)(3)(C).
299
Id. at § (b)(2)(B).
293
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level enhancement for brandishing or possessing a firearm.300 This
combination allows for an offender’s threatening use of a firearm as
well as injuries caused during the commission of the robbery to be
adequately punished. Reading the levels of enhancements together
with the 11-level limitation potentially suggests the Commission
intended to account for an offender’s conduct within reason but wanted
to avoid the use of the Guidelines as a prosecutorial hammer. 301
Under current law, a probation department and prosecutor may
consider a range of behaviors to mix and match different enhancement
provisions in robberies involving a firearm and reach the maximum or
within 1-level of the maximum. However, the limitation imposed on
subsections (2) and (3) does not apply to subsection (4), addressing the
physical restraint enhancement. Thus, it appears that the physical
restraint enhancement has been used in the first camp to circumvent
this limitation and maximize sentences, even when a plain language
reading of “physical restraint” would typically not include
psychological coercion.
An expansive reading of “physical restraint” also implicates the
long-standing rule discussed in Blockburger v. United States.302 In
Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of two counts of selling
morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser and one count of
“having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser
as required by [The Harrison Narcotic Act]” with respect to the sale in
the second count.303 The defendant was sentenced to five years and a
fine of $2,000 dollars for each count. 304 On appeal, the defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the two sales constituted only one offense,
and that the third count in relation to the count of the second sale was
also one offense. 305 The Supreme Court clearly expressed the
following: “The applicable rule is that, where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine where there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other

300

Id. at § (b)(2)(C).
See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1.
302
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
303
Id. at 301.
304
Id.
305
Id.
301
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does not.”306 Unfortunately for the defendant, each sale constituted a
separate fact: the first sale had concluded before the second sale began;
thus, they were individual sales. Applying this rule to the second and
third counts which occurred during the same transaction, the
prosecution proved that the defendant: (1) sold narcotics in violation
of the statute; and (2) this sale violated a separate section of the same
statute in that the forbidden drugs were not sold in the original stamped
package.307 Here, the “additional fact” which constituted separate
offenses was proof the drugs were not sold in their original packing
and the sentence was thus lawful. 308
Applying Blockburger to the Guidelines invites a potential
violation under certain circumstances. Suppose an offender enters a
bank with a firearm and points the firearm at the teller. The offender
says, “give me the money or else” and the teller hands over the money.
Under this set of facts, the offender could face sentencing
enhancements for making a threat of death under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). 309
Further, if this robbery occurred in a state residing in the First, Fourth,
Tenth or Eleventh Circuits, it is very likely the offender would face an
enhancement for physical restraint under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).310 The
facts proven would need to be as follows: (1) a robbery occurred; (2) a
firearm was used [triggering a number of enhancement under §
2B3.1(b)(2)]; and (3) the offender pointed the firearm at the victim
such that the (a) victim was instilled with a reasonable fear of death
and the (b) victim was physically restrained because the use of the
firearm instilled a reasonable fear of death. As illustrated above, the
instillment of a reasonable fear of death would constitute the same fact
and trigger two separate enhancement provisions.
Although
Blockburger applies to offenses themselves rather than sentencing
enhancements, the logic is instructive to show how identical conduct
under the current statutory scheme can be used to charge multiple
enhancements based on very small differences in actual conduct.

306

Id. at 304.
Id. at 302-03.
308
Id. at 302-04.
309
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021).
310
Id. at § (b)(4)(B).
307
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Of all the circuit courts, only one has developed a test for
determining whether the physical restraint enhancement applies. 311
The Second Circuit outlined a three-part test in its recent decision in
United States v. Taylor. 312 Under the first prong of the test, the
restraint must be “physical.”313 The Second Circuit’s focus under this
prong is whether the restraint imposes physical immobility or rather
causes the victim to feel restraint.314 The second prong of the test
focuses on “qualifying physical ‘restraint’ and nonqualifying physical
‘force.’”315 Qualifying acts of physicality and nonqualifying acts are
determined on the basis of which they occur. Articulating previous
case law, this circuit emphasized that physical contact alone is
insufficient to trigger the enhancement, while physical contact which
facilitates the commission of the crime is sufficient. 316 To illustrate
this point, the court discussed Rosario,317 where the defendant struck
a mail carrier such that the mail carrier fell to the ground. 318 The
defendant then stepped on the mail carrier’s throat while stealing his
personal items.319 The Second Circuit noted that this defendant used
multiple types of physical force, but only stepping on the mail carrier’s
throat “facilitated the commission of the offense in that the victim
could do nothing…because of the physical restraint.” 320 The final
prong of the Taylor test contemplates where and how the restraint
occurs.321 The court stated the restraint “must be more than a ‘direction
to move [that] is typical of most robberies.’”322 Clarifying this
standard, the court explained in cases where the offender directs an
employee at gun point, to behind the cash register, the conduct is
insufficient to trigger the sentencing enhancement because moving an
employee to the register or other cash storage would be typical of most
311
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robberies.323 Citing to United States v. Paul, the court articulated that
“in the absence of physical restraint similar to being bound or moved
into a locked or at least confining space, the enhancement is not to be
added where the direction to move is typical of most robberies.” 324
By means of this three-part test, the Second Circuit has
narrowed the scope of physical restraint to give meaning to the words
enacted by Congress. Specifically, even where a defendant moves a
victim at gun point into another room, the enhancement will only apply
if the victim is confined to that room. 325 The decision in Taylor
appears to reflect a long deliberation over application of the
enhancement provision in that the Second Circuit had warned about a
broad interpretation of physical restraint as early as 1999.326
In the introduction of this Note, I proposed a hypothetical.
Applying Taylor, we see that the offender’s conduct would be
insufficient to trigger the sentencing enhancement. In that example,
the hypothetical offender pointed her firearm at a bank patron and told
him to jump up and hop up and down on one leg. This conduct would
not physically immobilize the patron despite a likely feeling of
restraint, and thus fails prong one. Further, this demand is unlikely to
facilitate the crime in any manner, failing prong two as well. Finally,
this type of ordered movement, although atypical of most robberies,
involves no binding or locking away of the victim and also fails prong
three. The hypothetical also indicated that the offender “beg[an]
moving occupants around the bank in furtherance of her objective.”327
This sentence invites the potential application of the physical restraint
sentencing enhancement depending on how and where the offender
moved the occupants. Suppose she dragged the victims into the bank
vault, collected the money, and locked all the victims in the vault
before escaping. Under this set of facts, the offender’s conduct was
physical because it facilitated the commission of the crime and,
although typical of most robberies, caused the victims to be locked
away, a manner of restraint consistent with the Guidelines.
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CONCLUSION

The Sentencing Guidelines were designed in part to bring
uniformity to sentencing of like crimes nationwide. However,
interpretative differences among the circuit courts have led to the
opposite result. The same crimes consisting of the same conduct are
punished with significantly different amounts of time, purely based on
the geographic location of the crime itself. A policy statement offered
by the Sentencing Commission indicates their mission to balance
uniformity in sentencing with the age-old criminal punishment theory
of proportionality.328
Sentences should reflect the individual
offender’s conduct and history, but sentences among similarly situated
offenders should be similar in length. A nationwide adoption of the
Taylor test would effectively close the door on a circuit split and
further the congressional intent and goals of the Guidelines. Finally,
an adoption of this magnitude would lend credence to the notion that
“words should mean something[.]”329
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